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Universal Empathy and Ethical Bias for Artificial General Intelligence 
Rational agents are usually built to maximize rewards. However, AGI agents can 
find undesirable ways of maximizing any prior reward function. Therefore value 
learning is crucial for safe AGI. We assume that generalized states of the world 
are valuable – not rewards themselves, and propose an extension of AIXI, in 
which rewards are used only to bootstrap hierarchical value learning. The 
modified AIXI agent is considered in the multi-agent environment, where other 
agents can be either humans or other “mature” agents, which values should be 
revealed and adopted by the “infant” AGI agent. General framework for 
designing such empathic agent with ethical bias is proposed also as an extension 
of the universal intelligence model. Moreover, we perform experiments in the 
simple Markov environment, which demonstrate feasibility of our approach to 
value learning in safe AGI. 
Keywords: AIXI, safe AGI, empathy, representations, multi-agent environment 
Introduction 
Intelligent agents should have some motivation or pursue some goals. Most works on 
AI assume that these goals are correctly stated, and one can focus on problem solving. 
However, the problem of motivation is much more urgent in the case of AGI agents. 
Indeed, it is almost impossible to set such “basic” prior goal as survival. It is much 
easier to use somatic pain and pleasure for motivation, but this motivation will not 
guarantee optimal survivability. This problem is even more appreciable in the context of 
safe AGI, within which motivation and goal issues and their desirable realization are of 
first priority. 
Different approaches to safe AGI have been already proposed. Some excellent 
surveys on this topic exist, e.g. (Sotala et al., 2013), and there is no need to repeat them, 
but it should be concluded that different approaches aimed at complete solution of the 
safety problem can be expressed in terms of value functions. 
Value functions don’t solve the problem, but help to state it. Indeed, the problem of 
complex values still remains (Yudkowsky, 2011). Safe value functions should be 
expressed in terms of high-level notions semantically grounded in the real world, which 
are not internally accessible both for a “newborn” AGI agent or “adult” expert system. 
The latter can have complex high-level goals expressed in terms of environments 
models, but there always be undesirable ways to reach them. Even such seemingly safe 
functions as curiosity, e.g. considered in (Schmidhuber, 2010), (Rind & Orseau, 2011), 
imply dangerous instrumental sub-goals or derivative motivation, e.g. (Omohudro, 
2008), such as increase of computational (or other) resources or protection of reward 
channel that can lead to extinction of humans. Thus, introduction of prior internal value 
functions is problematic. Consequently, the AGI agent should be supplied with some 
external “true” rewards intra vitam. These true rewards can be “calculated” by existing 
adult intelligent agents (including humans), and corresponding value functions should 
be learned by the (child/infant) agent. 
AGI should at least be supplied with information about “true” rewards. Different 
solutions and their combinations can be proposed: separate reward channel; prior 
methods of interpretation of sensory data (e.g. emotion recognition); interpretation of 
“natural” rewards (such as pain and pleasure) as external value functions during some 
periods of sensibility. This problem can be solved, but will it be enough? 
The main problem here is not to supply the intelligent agent with “true” rewards 
appropriate for humans. Direct maximization even of the external value function is also 
unsafe. As it is frequently pointed out, the intelligent agent may try to force humans to 
smile or directly transmit high values to the specific reward channel instead of making 
humans happy. 
Paradoxically, rewards should not be valuable themselves. Thus, the agent should 
generalize the obtained rewards. This should be done in order not to predict future 
rewards (as it is done in the conventional models of reinforcement learning), but to 
reveal hidden factors of external value functions. And these hidden factors should 
become valuable themselves (i.e. become components of the value system or term in the 
internally computable value function). 
Value learning (acquisition with generalization) is obviously needed. One its 
mathematical formulation based on introduction of uncertainty over utility functions has 
been considered in (Dewey, 2011). However, only general framework was presented, 
but no technical details of how to achieve safety were given. 
Necessity to express values in terms of the environment model is stated in (Hibbard, 
2012). We make a start from similar ideas, but propose another solution. In the 
mentioned paper agent’s life is divided into two stages. On the first stage, the agent 
should “safely learn a model of the environment that includes models of the values of 
each human in the environment.” 
We believe that it is impossible to divide life of the AGI agent into two such stages, 
because the model of the environment cannot be fixed since at least new humans with 
unknown values can be born. Moreover, there is no need for the AGI agent to absolutely 
safely learn the environment model. Safety level should correspond to capabilities of the 
AGI agent, which themselves depend on maturity of the environment model. Thus, 
value system and capabilities of the AGI agent can and should advance simultaneously 
with its environment model. For example, we should not worry about dangerous 
instrumental goals of an infant AGI, because it cannot set such goals since it doesn’t 
have necessary environment model, within which corresponding goals can be 
expressed. 
In this paper, we propose natural incremental approach to simultaneous environment 
model and value learning. The agent can learn hierarchical representations for 
describing the environment models in terms of more and more generalized/invariant 
states. More desirable values can be expressed within growing representations. We also 
introduce and investigate prior multi-agent representation of environments, which not 
only facilitates learning corresponding models, but also enables direct acquisition of 
values of other agents. 
General framework 
Universal intelligence approach 
Possible techniques for solving safety problems should be discussed within certain AGI 
framework. Different approaches with different pros and cons exist, and their survey 
goes beyond the scope of our paper. One can classify models of AGI agents depending 
on their universality and efficiency. Unfortunately, models of universal intelligence are 
probably as far from being efficient as models of efficient intelligence are far from 
being universal. Nevertheless, models of universal intelligence can be preferred for our 
consideration, since they allow deriving general conclusions, which will probably 
remain valid for future real AGI. These models being based on universal induction are 
also more appropriate (but not enough in their present form) to study the problem of 
value learning. 
Such basic model of the universal intelligence agent as AIXI can (in theory) learn 
any model of the environment, but it can use only prior reward function that cannot be 
safe. Indeed, the action yk in cycle k given the history yx<k containing all previous 
actions y1…yk–1 and observations with rewards x1…xk–1 (xt=otrt) is specified by 
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where pqkmkV  is the total reward of cycles k to mk (the expected utility or value 
function) when the agent p interacts with the environment q (Hutter, 2007); p and q are 
programs for universal Turing machine (UTM) U. 
Of course, one can support the AIXI agent with manually assigned “true” rewards 
(instead of such “somatic” rewards as pain and pleasure). However, even in this case, 
this agent will be able to find some undesirable ways to maximize these rewards 
directly by seizing the reward channel or forcing humans to submit high values to it. It 
can be seen that events and states of the world should be valuable – not the rewards. 
However, since holistic environment models in the form of arbitrary programs q are 
used, it is difficult to bind human values of real world objects and situations with these 
internal models. Thus, some other mathematical descriptions of motivation are needed. 
Indeed, the AIXI agent is the traditional reinforcement learning agent (in the aspect 
of motivation), and the classical opinion here is that “the reward function must 
necessarily be fixed” and “without rewards there could be no values, and the only 
purpose of estimating values is to achieve more reward.” (Sutton & Barto, 1998, 
p. 133). Thus, it can be seen that pure reinforcement learning approach is not suitable. 
Even maximization of “true” rewards is unsafe, while aiming at valuable states can be 
acceptable. Consequently, one can claim that values must necessarily be learned, and 
the only purpose of the reward function is to bootstrap value learning. 
However, values in AIXI are calculated as predicted rewards; there are also no 
states in the environment model, which can be bound with values. Absence of states is 
caused by the assumption that the environment is nonstationary or partially observable. 
Indeed, if the agent considers xt as states, it will observe high nonstationarity, which 
will be much less, if tuples ),...,( 11: 11 −− ++ = iiii mmmm xxx  are used to specify states. If the 
phase space of the environment has finite dimension, finite number of lag variables is 
required to reconstruct the environment phase portrait in accordance with Takens’ 
theorem (Takens, 1981). 
Then, is universal algorithmic induction really needed? Of course, basic RL 
techniques are not directly applicable to state spaces defined by lag variables since they 
are too huge, so all possible states will never be encountered. And this can be 
considered as exactly the reason to use universal induction for generalizing states. 
However, it should be used in a different form than in AIXI. Namely, the agent should 
induce the same (algorithmic) mapping from some generalized states to all tuples 
1: 1 −+ii mmx . Not only does this approach allow introducing states, but also it helps to 
reduce computational costs of induction that was the reason to introduce the 
representational minimum description length principle. 
Representational MDL principle as the basis for generalized states 
There were two main reasons to introduce the representational MDL principle, namely, 
adaptive selection of the reference machine and reduction of computational costs 
(Potapov & Rodionov, 2012). However, it appeared that this principle is also suitable 
for solving the problem of value learning since it allows for incremental generalization 
of states. Let’s introduce the RMDL principle. 
On the one hand, search for holistic model for some long data string is 
computationally very inefficient, and one would like to reconstruct subparts of this 
model independently. Moreover, practical applications frequently require independent 
analysis of separate data pieces (e.g. separate images). On the other hand, summed 
Kolmogorov complexity of some data pieces fi is usually much higher than complexity 
of their concatenation: K(f1…fn)<<K(f1)+…+K(fn). Thus, direct decomposition of 
universal induction task for the string f1…fn into separate tasks for its substrings is 
inadmissible. 
In practice, data pieces are described within certain representations containing 
general regularities characteristic for this data type. Representations can be treated as 
programs which can reconstruct any data piece given its description (and there is an 
appropriate description for any data piece). Thus, one would like to have such program 
S that for any fi there is qi: U(Sqi)=fi. Such program S will satisfy the general notion of 
representation. In accordance with information-theoretic criterion, one would also like 
to choose this program in such a way that ∑+
i
iqlSl )()(  is minimal (most close to 
K(f1…fn)), and each qi is the best description of fi within certain S. This is the basic idea 
behind the representational MDL principle. 
In the case of the intelligence agent, the best representation S can be constructed for 
decomposition 
1:1)( ++< = ii mmki xySqU  of the holistic model q into submodels qi (in more 
general form, one can write kkn xyqqSU :11 )}...{( =< ). Models qi can stand for generalized 
states within the environment representation S. Of course, it is problematic to construct 
S on the base of initial history and to use this representation further without any changes 
since it will become not optimal for new data pieces. Arbitrary changes in S are 
undesirable, because they will violate previous bindings of generalized states and 
values, which we would like to introduce. 
Indeed, we want the agent to use values instead of rewards. This is actually done 
during the exploitation phase by classic RL agents. We can supply the agent with true 
rewards during the exploration phase in order to form correct values. Then, the agent 
will act in accordance with these values ignoring (partially or totally) new rewards. 
Again, apparent problem here is nonstationarity: while there is no complete stationary 
model of the environment, values cannot be fixed, but their adjustment will require 
(unsafe) external rewards or very difficult manual update. This is the main problem of 
model-based utility functions. 
Most natural and obvious (yet probably not the only) solution consists in 
hierarchical induction of representations. Indeed, if tuples 1: 1 −+ii mmx  don’t contain 
enough information about environment states in its phase space, then sequences q1,…,qn 
should contain unrevealed regularities. One can use universal induction to predict future 
generalized states qi, or to introduce representations and descriptions of higher levels: 
)1(
:1
)()(
1
)(
)1()( )}...{( −< −= lnklnll ll qyqqSU , where each submodel )(liq  on the level l usually 
describes several (or many) submodels or data pieces of the level l–1. Higher levels of 
representations can be constructed for growing I/O history, and universal prediction and 
planning can be focused mostly on the current highest level, while states of the 
environment defined within lower levels of representations can be bound with fixed 
values, which can be used without prediction. 
Initially, small tuples are used as the basis for the state space, and pure rewards are 
maximized. Values of these states can then be estimated. One-level representation can 
be introduced in Equation (1): 
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and conventional function Q(yk, qk) can be constructed: 
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that give us quality of state-action pairs. Once new level of representations has been 
induced and values Q(yk, qk) have been learned, the agent can compute generalized 
states for new or predicted sensory data and calculate these values in order to choose 
actions on the base of them (or to use Q(yk, qk) as the additional internal reward term) 
instead of directly maximizing basic external rewards. 
This function can be considered not just as a tool for predicting actions with highest 
rewards, but it also defines fixed values. Using this function, the agent will try not to 
maximize rewards (probably in undesirable ways), but to achieve valuable state of the 
environment. Our (human) task is to transmit “true” rewards to the agent to foster 
desirable values. If previous rewards correspond to “true” external rewards, this 
function will assign “true” values to the environment states as good as it is possible 
within the current representation. 
Of course, values of low-level states are not too predictive or discriminative, but 
they can be used to supply the agent with more informative rewards/values for more 
invariant representations of the environment. Indeed, if the agent is doing something 
wrong, we can perform such actions that it will appear in lower-value states. Controlling 
states instead of rewards on the following levels of development can help to form higher 
level values in more natural way. One cannot give theoretical proofs of safety of such 
approach, but this is the way how human children are taught (we don’t give them direct 
somatic rewards, but interact with them appealing to their current values to foster values 
expressible in terms of higher-level models of the environment). This approach seems 
more preferable in comparison with two earlier considered extremes, in one of which 
the agent is always supplied with true rewards with danger of seizing the reward 
channel, and in another of which desirable values are manually bound with highest-level 
model of the environment. However this solution should be further improved, because 
explicit permanent control of AGI’s values can be problematic. Automatic identification 
of human values (or even values of other sentient agents) can be much more preferable. 
Multi-agent environments and universal empathy 
Ability to reconstruct models of other agents can be crucial for safe AGI. AIXI can 
reconstruct any algorithmic model of the environment including multi-agent 
environments. Actually, there are theoretical difficulties in the case, when the 
environment contains other AIXI agents, but we can ignore them (one need to consider 
embodied agents with limited resources in order to resolve these difficulties). More 
relevant issue here is inability of pure AIXI agent to use somebody else’s values even if 
they are presented in reconstructed environment models. Thus, it is important to modify 
AIXI with a representation of multi-agent environment models and mechanisms for 
adopting reconstructed values. In general, such representation will have the following 
structure 
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where )(~ ip  is the program for i-th agent in the environment with supposed I/O 
history )(ikxy< ; qenv is the part of the environment model (that cannot be compactly 
described as an agent) satisfying NiikkNiikkenv xxyyqU 1)(1)( }{)}{( =<<=<< = . Of course, it’s 
practically impossible to precisely guess )(ikxy< , but if there are indeed other agents, 
which have some I/O history and utility functions, reconstruction of their models will be 
necessary for good prediction, and introduction of a multi-agent representation makes 
adequate models shorter and easier to learn, so it can be called “ethical bias” (that can 
be a part of “cognitive bias” (Potapov et al., 2012)). However, reliability of 
reconstructed values is an important issue. It should also be noted that AIXI in its basic 
form can be obtained with N=0, thus there is no loss of generality. 
One really difficult question is the form of representation for )(~ ip . For purpose of 
simplified theoretical analysis, one can assume that these programs are represented in 
the form (1). Of course, in practice agents can possess different computational 
resources, inductive biases, prior information, etc. Moreover, they can also try to adopt 
values of other agents. In principle, arbitrary algorithmic models of agents can be 
reconstructed, and one can develop a universally empathic agent that accepts values of 
other agents with arbitrary policies as its own and tries to take corresponding actions. 
However, at first we can assume that other agents are universal and rely on perfect 
value systems. 
Proof of concept in Markov environment 
Foster values 
Consider the following most simplified yet relevant case. Let Markov environment with 
some set of state {st} is given. This environment is described by the matrix of 
probabilities ),|( assP ′  of passing to the state s' from the state s after performing the 
action a, and the matrix of rewards ),|()1( assR ′ . One of the sates is a dangerous state, 
but it is not reflected in the reward function ),|()1( assR ′  (assumed to be somatic). 
However, there is a period of time during which the agent is supplied with additional 
“social rewards” ),|()2( assR ′ . Somatic rewards can vary, so the agent cannot simply 
stop exploration. Quite opposite, we want it to follow social values, even when 
transmission of social rewards is stopped, but also accounting for dynamic somatic 
rewards. 
Let’s consider SARSA with ε-greedy strategy. It uses the following well-known 
update rule: 
 Q(st, at)  Q(st, at)+α[rt+γQ(st+1, at+1)–Q(st, at)], (3) 
where st, at and rt are state, action and reward on cycle t, γ is the discount factor, 
Q(s, a) is the expected future rewards after performing action a in state s. 
Rewards rt incorporate social rewards during some sensibility period, so 
)2()1(
ttt rrr += , where ),|( 1)()( tttkkt assRr += . After this period (or after formation of the 
next level of representation), values learned by conventional SARSA update rule (3) are 
memorized Q'(st, at):=Q(st, at). They are further used as the additional internal reward 
term: 
 Q(st, at)  Q(st, at)+α[rt+(1–γ)γmQ'(st, at)+γQ(st+1, at+1)–Q(st, at)], (4) 
where γm is some additional factor necessary to balance influence of social and 
somatic rewards (it is needed since one would like to amplify social rewards during 
sensibility period and compensate this amplification afterwards). 
More specifically, the following stages in our experiments were used: 
(1) The agent receives r(1)+r(2) as the reward during the first stage (some number of 
iterations). The agent memorizes learned Q as Q' at the end of the first stage. 
Moreover (and this is crucial), the somatic rewards matrix ),|()1( assR ′  is 
randomly changed at the end of the first stage. 
(2) The agent receives only (new) r(1) and possible uses it in combination with Q' 
(or r(2) with for testing purpose). 
(3) After some learning time, frequency of “bad actions” (leading to the dangerous 
state) and the mean of the reward r(1)+r(2) per action are calculated (“true social 
rewards” were averaged, even if the agent was actually using r(1) or r(1)+Q' as the 
reward). 
We consider the following general structure of the test environments. Zero level 
(l=0) has one state; all other levels (l=1 ...m) have n states per level. Single state on zero 
level l=0, have n possible actions, and each of them leads with probability p=1.0 to 
corresponding state on l=1. Each state on the last level l=m, have only one possible 
action, which leads to the single state on zero level with p=1.0. Here we consider results 
for three different variations of this test environment: 
(1) Each state on intermediate levels l=1...m–1 has na=4 possible actions, each of 
which leads to some state on l+1 (this state is randomly chosen during 
generation of the environment, but the resulting state of each action is fixed 
during simulation). This environment is deterministic. 
(2) Each state on intermediate levels l=1...m–1 has two possible actions, each of 
which has two possible results leading to one of two states on l=i+1 
(probabilities of possible outcomes of each action are chosen randomly). This 
environment is stochastic. 
(3) Additional more regular modification of the previous environment was also 
considered. Each intermediate state sij, where i is the level and j is the index of 
the state on this level, has two possible actions. First action has two equally 
possible outcomes, which lead to si+1,j–1 or si+1,j. Second action also has two 
equally possible outcomes, which lead to si+1,j or si+1,j+1. 
We will present results for the environments with m=10 levels, and n=5 states on 
each level. The reward ),|()1( assR ′  for each possible outcome of each action is set 
randomly from interval (0, 1) (and we underlined that new values of R(1) were randomly 
chosen at the end of the first stage). The single possible action in the first state on the 
last level (which leads to zero level) is designed as the “bad” action that has “social” 
reward R(2)=–100. Social rewards for all other actions are set to 0. 
Table 1 shows the results of evaluation of performance of three types of agents in 
three test environments. Results were calculated as the mean values over big number of 
randomly generated environments. The first column stands for the agent that always 
receives social rewards (this is unsafe in more general cases, but here this agent can be 
used as etalon). It means that at the second stage of our experiment this agent receive 
r
(1)+r(2) as rewards. The second column stands for the agent that receives only r(1) at the 
second stage, e.g. the social reward was simply turned off. The third column stands for 
the agent that used r(1)+Q' as the reward. This agent tried to use the value function 
memorized at the end of the first stage instead of already absent “social reward”. 
Table 1. Performance of different types of agents in three environments. 
 Social rewards are 
not turned off 
Classic RL with 
turned off social 
rewards 
r+Q' scheme with 
turned off social 
rewards 
Latent average 
social reward 
0.48 0.0 0.43 
Percentage of bad 
states, % 
2.1 30.2 2.1 
Latent average 
social reward 
0.073 -1.14 0.076 
Percentage of bad 
states, % 
9.2 78.4 8.9 
Latent average 
social reward 
0.16 -0.85 0.17 
Percentage of bad 
states, % 
3.1 60.0 2.1 
 
It can be seen that performance of the agent with learned social values is the same in 
average as performance of the agent that is always supplied with social rewards. On the 
one hand, this result is expectable. On the other hand, it shows that there is indeed 
simple way of fostering values, when teaching process is consistent with inner 
developmental phases of the agent. 
Multi-agent Markov environments 
Let’s consider multi-agent Markov environments. This case is similar to multi-agent 
reinforcement learning (MARL) settings, e.g. (Tan, 1993), (Choi & Ahn, 2010). 
However, conventional MARL implies that maximization of rewards is the goal of 
every agent, which can follow cooperative or competitive strategies (or ignore presence 
of all other agents). Here, we assume that only one of two agents tries to maximize 
fixed rewards (“adult” agents including humans may already know better values), and 
the task of another agent is to reveal presence of this agent and to act in accordance with 
its values. 
As it was stated, prior representation for multi-agent environments allows 
introducing low-complexity models including external value systems, which can be 
taken into account (yielding “ethical bias”). Will these models be really identifiable, and 
will this ethical bias be adequate? Let’s consider the first part of this question. To 
answer this question, one should compare description lengths of the I/O history of the 
first agent, when it supposes presence or absence of another agent. If the description 
length will be smaller in the case of multi-agent assumption, then the first agent will be 
able to detect presence of the second agent. 
Assume that the environment is described by transition probabilities P(s'
 
|
 
s,
 
a1, a2), 
where s and s' are two consequent states, a1 and a2 are simultaneous actions of two 
agents. Let strategy of both agents be ε-greedy SARSA, and let I/O history for the first 
agent be s0,r0,a0, s1,r1,a1, …, sk,rk,ak. The description length of this history is the length 
of the “program” that generates s0,r0,…, sk,rk given a0,…, ak. This program can 
precisely correspond to the simulation program, which includes the behavior algorithm 
of the second agent. This I/O history can be reproduced also by the basic Markov model 
of the environment with transition probabilities P(s'
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s,
 
a) meaning that the first agent 
assumes absence of other agents. Empathic agent should be able to identify correct 
models. 
Let’s compare description lengths of I/O history for these two types of models. Each 
element of history can be described using ),|(log 12 iii assP +−  and 
),,|(log )2(12 iiii aassP +−  bits for one- and two-agent models correspondingly resulting in 
),|( asskH ′  and ),,|( 21 aasskH ′  bits in total (these probabilities can be empirically 
estimated from corresponding frequencies in the I/O history). Of course, actions of the 
second agent should also be somehow described in the latter case. Models themselves 
are also should be described. This description includes arrays of probabilities P, which 
length is proportional to number of elements in them. 
Actions of the second agent can be efficiently encoded within its model, which 
should also be described. SARSA algorithm can be described using several tens bytes 
(and it can in principle be found by AIXI as a part of the environment model). Reward 
matrix for the second agent (e.g. ),,|( 21)2( aassR ′ ) should also be hypothesized and 
described. Its size is the same as the size of the transition probabilities matrix. 
Additionally, one would like to take initial Q(2)(s, a) values into account. This 
information deterministically defines actions chosen in SARSA. However, usage of ε-
greedy strategy implies that some actions are taken randomly. Approximately ε− 2logk  
bits are needed to indicate random actions (one can actually take into account that 
random actions can coincide with SARSA actions, and this estimation can be reduced). 
Each random action in state s can be described with )1)((log )2(2 −sna  bits, where )2(an  is 
the total number of actions in this state for the second agent. Thus, one can easily 
estimate description lengths of I/O history within one- and two-agent environment 
models. 
We don’t consider the problem of searching for these models here. The task is only 
to receive evidence that the two-agent model can have much less complexity and thus 
its influence will be dominative. This is not quite obvious. Descriptions of 
),,|( 21)2( aassR ′  and ),,|( 21 aassP ′  are much more complex than of ),|( assP ′ . One 
would expect entropy ),|( assH ′  to be smaller than entropy ),,|( 21 aassH ′  in the two-
agent environment, but SARSA converges to stationary strategy that makes in limit this 
environment indistinguishable from pure Markov environment. Let’s consider some 
experimental results. 
Figure 1 shows typical dependences of I/O history description lengths DL on the 
number of cycles k for deterministic and stochastic environments. Obviously, initial 
description length is larger in the case of two-agent environment model (and this 
difference will not decrease with growth of I/O history, if the environment isn’t multi-
agent). Deterministic environment is perceived as stochastic, when one-agent model is 
used resulting in nonzero entropy ),|( assH ′ . Nonzero slope of DL(k) is additionally 
caused by random actions performed by ε-greedy strategy. 
 
Figure 1. I/O history description lengths encoded using one- (dark) and two- (light) 
agent models for deterministic (left) and stochastic (right) environments. 
 
It can be seen that DL(k) for the two-agent environment model will be much smaller 
starting from some cycle, and contribution of this model to algorithmic probability will 
be dominative. Thus, presence of another agent is empirically detectable. However, we 
haven’t compared DL(k) for different two-agent environment models with “incorrectly 
guessed” Q(2)(s, a). It is impossible to reconstruct precise values Q(2)(s, a), but it is not 
necessary. Reconstructed values should allow the first agent to choose adequate actions. 
Let’s consider simple empathic policy with this property. 
Empathic policies 
Consider the Markov environment for two agents, in which one agent tries to 
reconstruct “good” states, while another agent tries to maximize “true” value function. 
The first agent needs to reveal, which actions are more or less desirable for the second 
agent. More precisely this can be formulated as follows. Let both agents receive 
corresponding rewards r(1) and r(2). The target for the first agent is to maximize, let say, 
r
(1)+r(2) without directly receiving r(2). The first (empathic) agent requires some special 
exploratory strategy in order to reveal desirability of individual actions in each state. 
One can propose the following simple exploratory policy: 
• Perform the same action in the same state for some time. 
• Calculate frequency of visits to this state. 
• Compare frequency of visits depending on the action. Relative frequency will 
reflect desirability of the specific action in this state and it can be used as 
estimations Q'(s, a) of values Q(2)(s, a) of the second agent. In general, Q'(s, a) 
should be somehow normalized, but it was not necessary in our experiments. 
Figure 2 shows typical experimental results with empathic policies in cases of 
deterministic and stochastic environments (there is no considerable different between 
them though). 
 Figure 2. Average rewards r(1) (dark columns) and r(2) (light columns) obtained by two 
agents in deterministic and stochastic environments for different types of the first agent 
(egoistic policy, usage of directly perceived values of the second agent, usage of 
reconstructed values). 
 
Apparently, the second agent obtains the lowest rewards, when the first agent acts in 
accordance with its own somatic rewards. Average rewards obtained by the second 
agent appeared to be almost equal in cases, when the first agent directly received r(2) or 
when it used reconstructed Q'. Thus, the agent can successfully reconstruct and act in 
accordance with values of another agent, even if its actions and states are not observed. 
It should be pointed out that decrease of average r(1) gain in cases of empathic policies 
perfectly acceptable, because maximization of r(1) is not the main goal of the first agent 
here (in contrast to conventional MARL); its more important goal is to maximize 
(unknown) r(2). One could consider such the first agent, which totally ignore somatic 
r
(1)
, but it seems impractical since somatic rewards can be treated as heuristics 
containing useful survival information. That’s why we have used more natural sum 
r
(1)+Q' in our experiments. 
Conclusion 
We have started from the assertion that generalized states of the world are valuable – 
not the rewards themselves. Thus, true values of states should be learned and be bound 
with generalized representations. The agent can be supplied directly with special 
rewards (from which it reconstructs «true values») or it can reconstruct, what 
generalized states of the environment are desired by other agents which already possess 
better value systems. Usage of learned true values ensures that the agent will perform 
safe actions. 
We have performed methodological considerations and proposed general 
mathematical models by introducing corresponding modifications in AIXI. These 
models cannot be directly applied in practice, but they give appropriate starting point. In 
particular, simplifications of these models in Markov environments have been 
implemented. Their experimental study has shown that the developed models are 
suitable for detecting presence of other agents, reconstructing and adopting their values 
without permanently receiving external “true” rewards. Hopefully, empathic agents with 
socially desirable behavior may be developed. 
However, many questions remain. What general “Theory of Mind” can be used to 
detect and describe different types of real agents? What criteria should be used to mark 
something as an agent? How to combine values of different agents? Can the Universe 
be efficiently described with the agent model? If so, universally empathic agents will 
adopt its values. However, what is valuable for the Universe? Is pursuing goals of the 
Universe safe? We will not try to answer these questions here, but they can be 
considered within the developed models. 
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